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MEMORANDUM TO THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS 
CORPUS REVJE.W __ rip CAPITAL SENTENCES 
-~-' ~--
f our last meeting on 
ese minutes in draft and 
I look forward to seeing you at our next meeting here in Washington 
on January 30. With best wishes for the Holidays. 
~~ 
Attachment 
cc: Chief Justice of the United States 
Mr. Noel J. Augustyn 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
' t'. "1""'" r ·\ .! 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON HABEAS 
CORPUS REVIEW OF CAPITAL SENTENCF.S 
Minutes of the Meeting of November 30, I 988 
The Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus Review of Capital Sentences 
held its second meeting at the Supreme Court Building, Washington, on November 30, 
1988. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., presided, and all members of the committee were 
present. Also in attendance were Professor Albert Pearson of the University of Georgia 
Law School, Hewitt Pate, Law Clerk to Justice Powell, and William R. Burchill, Jr., 
General Counsel, Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 
Justice Powell opened the meeting by asking the committee's approval of the 
minutes of its first meeting, held on September 16, 1988. Those minutes were approved 
unanimously. Justice Powell then noted that the committee had received a legal 
memorandum from Professor Pearson prepared incident to its discussions at the last 
meeting. He called upon Professor Pearson to summarize the essence of the 
memorandum. 
Professor Pearson began by stating the need to refute any view that death penalty 
habeas corpus petitions do not constitute a major burden on the Federal courts. While 
habeas corpus cases account statistically for only about four er cent of civil filings in ¥- /4 er{ 
the United States district courts, it is evident that habeas corpus review of capital cases 
is unique in its consumption of judicial time and resources. He noted that, in evaluating 
the sources of this burden, concerns as to adequacy of legal representation are widely 
perceived as a leading cause, although these concerns span the whole habeas corpus 
jurisdiction and are not confined by any means to death penalty cases. Professor Pearson 
suggested that increased empirical information would be desirable in order to document 
( ' 
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the extent and nature of the courts' problems in adjudicating capital habeas claims. Such 
data would be helpful not only in documenting the degree of the problem and building 
support for remedial steps but also in refuting the thesis of critics of reform, as 
expressed in t he recent National Law Journal article regarding the Ad Hoc Committee's 
formation, that judges tend to be inimical to this category of their docket. ,---
Professor Pearson then identified the following potential changes as possible 
options to reduce the excess time and duplicative nature of Federal habeas review in 
capital cas~s: 
elimination of multiple opportunities for certiorari review at 
disparate stages of the process; 
design of a sequential system requiring complete disposition by 
a United States court of appeals of all lower court review prior 
to the opportunity to petition for certiorari; 
provision for an automatic stay of execution on first petition 
for Federal habeas review to eliminate the need for individual 
review of stay applications. 
At this point Justice Powell raised the question whether these conclusions extend 
beyond the Chief Justice's charge to the Ad Hoc Committee and might present too large 
an undertaking for change. Justice Powell noted that some commentators have 
suggested the desirability of eliminating dual Federal-state collateral review, as has 
occurred in the District of Columbia through the D.C. Court Reorganization Act of 1970, 
but questioned whether such an objective is beyond the Ad Hoc Committee's mandate. 
Professor Pearson in response stated that the Chief Justice's primary expressed interests 
f 
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a.re the creation of a statute of limitations upon state habeas review in Federal court and 
the provision of counsel for state habeas petitioners under sentence of death, thus 
enhancing the ability of the Federal courts to require timely and orderly processing of 
their pet itions. Professor Pearson urged, however, that the Ad Hoc Committee consider 
other ideas, including that of Professor Daniel Meador to confine Federal habeas review 
·- ----, 
to the court of appeals level. His proposal is also premised upon the provision of 
adequate counsel in the direct and collateral proceedings at the state level, resulting in a 
relatively complete factual record for Federal collateral review and diminishing the need 
for Federal evidentiary fact-finding. 
Justice Powell then inquired of Judge Sanders as to the plans and schedule of the 
American Bar Association task force on this issue. Judge Sanders responded that this 
task force has now been formed under the co-chairmanship of Judge Alvin Rubin of the 
Fifth Circuit and Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas of the California Supreme Court. It is a 
ten-member group with three appointments remaining to be made, and it will have 
available the reportorial services of Professor Ira Robbins of American University Law 
School. Judge Sanders added that the ABA task force has been given an 18-month time 
frame in which to make its report and has been asked to confine its efforts to the death 
penalty habeas situation, although its original mandate had been broader. Of further 
~~
relevance to the timing of the Ad Hoc Com mittee's study, Justice Powell cited the 
provisions of the recently enacted Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments of I 988, section 7323 of I 
which urges the Ad Hoc Committee to expedite filing its report and attempts to 
facilitate expeditious congressional consideration thereof. 
Judge Sanders then expressed the need for more empirical documentation of the 
extent of the death penalty habeas corpus problem. He noted the wide variation between 
the various state death penalty procedures as to when and how execution dates are fixed, 
-4-
setting the stage for Federal habeas review. At this point a general discussion took place 
as to the practicality of any attempt to standardize the disparate state death penalty 
procedures in the interest of avoiding last-minute review initiatives. The discussion 
focued on (1) the early provision of counsel to assure full and fair consideration of 
~ -- -~....,. 
constitutional objections as promptly as possible, together with the possibility of a 
statute of limitations to address late attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 
The discussion acknowledged that a statute of limitations cannot effectively bar late 
attacks based upon newly emergent principles of law or newly discovered evidence. 
Judge Clark stated that the key is to build a cooperative relationship between the 
Federal Judiciary and state governments, addressing orderly procedures in the relatively 
small universe of death penalty cases, and that this might even alleviate the need for a 
statute of limitations. Judge Sanders agreed that more evidence will be necessary to 
support the imposition of a Federal statute of limitations. 
Judge Hodges then addressed and supported the idea of providin - ~ 
\ ' 
' ( automatic stay of state execution proceedings to enable a petitioner's resort to Federal 
collateral review. He stated that such an automatic stay would reduce the public 
perception of Federal judges deliberately exercising their discretion on issuance of stay 
so as to frustrate state law and procedure. A discussion then took place as to the 
difficulty of attracting and retaining quality lawyers to serve as counsel to defendants 
confronting the death penalty. The consensus of the discussion was that the chronic 
delays and absence of any certainty in time commitment when undertaking this category 
~ 
of cases have deterred lawyers from volunteering a commitment which can extend over 
many years and readily subject them to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. ~ 
,-- - -------
Justice Powell then returned the discussion to the question of needed data. 
Judge Sanders suggested that it is necessary to determine the principal sources of delay 
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in these proceedings and particularly whether delay typically occurs in the Federal 
system or between the conclusion of state collateral proceedings and the institution of 
Federal proceedings. He also raised the question of the role of exhaustion requirements 
in propagating delay, the number of capital defendants who have counsel at the state 
level, and the time it takes these cases to move through the state judiciary. The 
question was then raised as to how to acquire this sort of data, and Professor Pearson 
suggested that the attorneys general of the states leading in death penalty imposition 
could be asked to provide it. 
Judge Roney expressed the desirability to eliminate duplicative appeals and to 
reduce death penalty cases to three distinct phases-direct review, state collateral 
review, and Federal habeas review. Judge Hodges expressed support for allowing state 
and Federal collateral review to proceed simultaneously. 
Justice Powell then asked Professor Pearson to review the categories of empirical 
data that would be needed and useful to fulfill the purposes delineated in the committee 
discussion. Professor Pearson answered that what is needed in summary is the procedural ---history of these cases, and he recited the following proposed specific data requests: --------------- --, 
time consumed in state court; 
time consumed in Federal court; 
time consumed resulting from failure to comply with 
exhaustion requirements; 
the practice of each state as to willingness to waive exhaustion 
compliance; 
the practice of the state in providing counsel for collateral 






an analysis of the reversal patterns of death sentences, i.e., 
how does each state define a reversal and at what stage do 
reversals occur? 
Justice Powell then proposed that the Ad Hoc Committee should communicate 
with the state attorneys general in each of the states within the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits to seek the categories of data outlined by Professor Pearson. The committee 
agreed that this will be done. In summarizing the need for such data, Judge Clark noted 
that it should inform the committee on the extent of needed Federal-state interaction or 
whether the need for reform measures is primarily confined to the Federal phase of this 
process. 
The question was then raised whether Professor Pearson will need professional 
assistance in collecting this data. He stated that the extent of needed assistance will 
depend upon whether the data is presented by the state attorneys general in standardized 
statistical form. He expressed the likely need for at least some statistical help, but it 
was agreed that this must await his initial contact with the attorneys' general offices 
after Justice Powell has made initi_!-1 contact with them by letter formally requesting 
.....__ ___ ~---------- - - .--- __________ _____... ..._._.- ----~ 
cooperation. It was agreed that, for the present, this exercise will be confined to the six 
- · ...-, 
states of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits because they have an estimated one-half of all 
death penalty cases and 90 percent of the executions. Professor Pearson noted that 
California is the only other state with relatively comparable numbers in these categories. 
Judge Roney then raised the question of devising a procedure for certification by 
the states to the appropriate United States court of appeals of the Federal constitutional 
issues implicit in a particular death sentence prior to the governor's signing of the death 
warrant. Judge Roney urged that legislation to this effect be seriously considered. 
? 
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Judge Clark distributed a check-list type memorandum employed in the Southern 
District of Alabama for death penalty habeas cases. He described it as a modified Rule r 
16 procedure with a pretrial order intended to expedite identification of issues and thus 
~
foreclose repetitive Federal petitions. 
Justice Powell noted that so far only Chief Judge Holloway of the Tenth Circuit 
has responded to his request to all Judicial Conference members to comment upon the 
Ad Hoc Committee's mission. Judge Holloway's letter focused upon the need to promote 
consistent and effective legal representation for capital defendants. Justice Powell 
stated that he will acknowledge Judge Holloway's letter. Justice Powell then reviewed 
the remainder of the meeting agenda, noting that the determination to acquire additional 
data would moot most of the remaining topics for present discussion. In particular, the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act provision affecting the Ad Hoc Committee had already been 
discussed, a decision about public hearings was deferred in view of the expressed concern 
about how to delineate the number of participants and assure the hearings' orderly 
conduct, and it was agreed that the preparation of tentative recommendations remains 
premature. Justice Powell urged the members to read the article by the late Judge 
McGowan which had been distributed. Judge Clark raised the issue of possibly 
establishing by procedural rule time limits upon various phases of capital habeas 
proceedings and the establishment of priorities for the disposition of such cases. Judge 
Clark clarified that he was not promoting this proposal, but Justice Powell directed that 
it be placed on the agenda for further discussion at the next Ad Hoc Committee 
meeting. Judge Sanders noted in this regard that nearly all preexisting statutory 
priorities on judicial disposition of cases were repealed by Congress in 1984 (Public Law 
No. 98-620, S 40l(a), 98 Stat. 3356), although habeas corpus cases remain a statutorily 
defined priority under 28 U.S.C. § 1657. 
," ~ I • • 
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In view of the committee's threshold decision to seek additional empirical 
information, it was agreed that there is no possibility of submitting any final 
recommendations to the Judicial Conference at its March 1989 meeting. Thus the 
committee decided to schedule its next meeting for Monday, January 30, at the Supreme 
Court Building in Washington. Finally, Justice Powell referred to a suggestion that the 
Ad Hoc Committee participate in the upcoming Brookings Institution seminar on 
relationships between Congress and the Judiciary, which is scheduled for April 6, 1989. 
Justice Powell questioned the relevance of this meeting to the Ad Hoc Committee's 
agenda, but it was decided to defer any decision on participation at the Brookings session 
until the committee's January 30 meeting to determine whether its proposals are then 
sufficiently developed to justify such participation. The committee then adjourned. 
Respectfully submitted, 
.c-1." 0/ /~ ,,/. 
Willi~rfn"~ ()_ • 
General Counsel 
r 
Summary of Issues for Task Force Consideration 
Preliminary Issues 
1) What is the purpose of state and federal post-
conviction review of state criminal convictions? Is the 
purpose different for capital than for non-capital cases? 
Issues Associated with the Competence, Provision, and Zeal of 
Counsel 
{_! l Tl i '. j 
2) Should the states be required to provide counsel 
for indigent persons after the first appeal as of right? If 
so, should the counsel requirement include state post-
conviction review? Review on certiorari in the United 
States Supreme Court? Should the federal government be 
required to provide counsel for indigent persons on federal 
habeas corpus review? 
3) What compensation and other resources should be 
provided? 
4) Should different counsel be appointed at some 
stage of the review process, such as on direct appeal in the 
state? 
- i -
5) Should jurisdictions create a formal system for 
providing counsel for indigent persons in capital cases? If 
so, how should the system be structured to attract and 
retain qualified attorneys and to insure independence of 
counsel and competent representation? 
6) Should standards for representation of 
defendants/appellants/petitioners in capital cases be 
established? If so, what standards? Should state and local 
bar associations take steps to implement these standards? 
Issues Associated with State Procedural Default Rules 
7) Should state procedural default rules apply in 
capital cases? If so, what should be the test for their 
application? Bow should the test apply to unintentional 
counsel errors? Under the Wainwright v. Sykes and Murray v. 
Carrier standard, how should the terms "fundamental 
fairness," "manifest injustice," and "miscarriage of 
justice" be defined for capital cases? 
8) Should federal judges be able to rule directly on 




Issues Associated with Exhaustion of State Judicial Remedies 
9) Should the exhaustion doctrine be eliminated or 
modified in death penalty habeas corpus cases? If the 
latter, are the rules for waiver of exhaustion already 
sufficient to accomplish the purposes of a modification? 
Alternatively, is an amendment to 28 u.s.c. SS 2254(b) and 
(c) warranted? 
10) Should the state routinely waive exhaustion in 
capital cases? 
11) Where unexhausted claims are presented to a 
federal district court that has stayed or is disposed to 
stay the execution, should that court hold the case in 
abeyance until all cognizable claims have been exhausted in 
the state system? 
Issues Associated with Successive Petitions, Abuse of the Writ, 
and Delay 
12) What standards should apply for federal courts to 
entertain second or successive petitions in capital cases? 
Should the standards for "same claim" successive petitions 
be different from those for "new claim" successive 
petitions? How should the term "ends of justice" be 
defined? 
- iii -
13) Should there be a statute of limitations for state 
and/or federal post-conviction petitions in death penalty 
cases? If so, what should the limitations period be? When 
would it start to run? What exceptions, if any, would 
exist? 
Issues Associated with Certificates of Probable Cause, Stays of 
Execution, and Last-Minute "Chaos" 
14) What measures, if any, should be adopted to 
require or encourage the filing of post-conviction 
proceedings before a date of execution is set? After a date 
of execution is set and collateral review is sought, when 
should a stay of execution be granted? For what duration? 
15) Should there continue to be a certificate-of-
probable cause requirement for the review of capital 
cases? If so, should it be restricted only to second or 
subsequent appeals from the denial of habeas corpus 
relief? If a district court denies a certificate of 
probable cause, what weight should the appellate court 
attach to that denial? 
16) If the certificate requirement continues to be 
applied in capital cases, when a district judge, circuit 
judge, or circuit justice grants a certificate of probable 
- iv -
cause should a stay of execution automatically be granted as 
well? If a federal district court grants relief on a habeas 
corpus claim, should it address the merits of all of the 
other questions as well? 
17) Are expedited procedures appropriate for the post-
conviction review of federal constitutional claims in death 
penalty cases? If so, when? What should they be? Should 
they be restricted only to second or subsequent appeals from 
the denial of habeas corpus relief? 
18) More generally, should the Task Force develop a 
"model timetable" for all of the stages of death penalty 
review? If so, what times are appropriate for each stage? 
What exceptions, if any, should be recognized? 
19) Whether or not there are expedited procedures, 
what internal procedures (such as assigning all motions and 
substantive matters in a case to the same panel) might make 
the review process both more fair and more efficient? 
20) Should priority be given to deciding death penalty 
cases in federal district courts and courts of appeals? 
- V -
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TO: JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMITTE 
ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW 
OF CAPITAL SENTENCES ~ 
FROM: ALBERT M. PEARSON, REPORTER 
RE: DEATH PENALTY PROCEDURAL HIS ORI 
DATE: JANUARY 27, 1989 
Attached is a chart setting forth the amount of time taken 
in the litigation of death penalty cases in the state and federal 
systems. The states submitting usable information ·were Alabama, 
Florida and Mississippi. Texas has provided extremely detailed 
case histories, but since this material arrived only today it 
could not be incorporated into this report. The information from 
Georgia and Louisiana was not sufficiently detailed to be 
utilized. 
What the attached chart shows is how much time is consumed 
in litigating death penalty cases in the state systems, in the 
lower federal courts and in the United States Supreme Court. 
Within each system, at this juncture at least, I couldn't break 
the chronologies down further and still provide the same 
information from each jurisdiction. For example, the chart 
doesn't separate state trial and direct appeal time from state 
post conviction . review time. Similarly, lower federal court 
review doesn't differentiate district court from circuit court 
consideration. Nor does it separate out applications for stays of 
execution from proceedings where a case is considered on its 
merits. I can get this information if you think it would be 
helpful to follow up. 
A few comments on what the entries on the chart include. 
The inmates are listed by state and within each state's listings, 
the inmates are listed by order of execution date. The frame of 
reference for my percentages is from the crime date to the 
execution date. My preference would have been to use the 
indictment date as the beginning point, but that information was 
not available in every case summary that I received. What this 
approach does is expand the amount of time allocated to the state 
courts beyond what it should be. If we get the indictment dates 
in all of the cases that we study, the state court time will drop 
in every instance and in some there may be a pretty significant 
drop. Of course, this will mean a corresponding increase in the 
percentage of time in the lower federal courts and in the Supreme 
Court. 
A summary of the other information categories on the chart 
follows: 
CRIME TO EXECUTION---gives the number of days from the crime 
date to the execution date and provides the dates for each. 
STATE COURT---gives the total time from the date of the 
crime through the completion of direct appeal; also 
includes state post conviction review time and any other 
proceedings that occur in state court including retrials, 
resentencings and applications for stays of execution. 
FEDERAL CO URT---gives the 







courts for any 
SUPREME COURT---same as the above; time is allocated to 
the Supreme Court from the time a lower court judgment 
becomes final until certiorari is denied or the Court 
takes some other dispositive action in a case. 
DOWN TIME---refers to time when a death penalty case is not 
pending in any court. Typically, this time shows up after 
a cert petition has been denied. A litigant will not go to 
the next stage of review---usually state or federal habeas 
corpus---until forced. Down time also occurs when state post 
conviction relief is denied. Florida cases have had quite a 
bit of what I call down time. 
Aggregate figures for the 24 cases studied reflect that 
there are 9.36 years from crime to execution. The averages for 
the other chart categories are: state court 4.06 years; lower 
federal court 2.51 years; Supreme Court 1.45 years; and down time 
1.34 years. 
I don't think these statistics, as general as they are, 
point to any dramatic conclusions. If a death penalty case is 
properly before a court, there is not a great deal that can be 
done to compel a judge or a panel of judges to rule more quickly 
than they might be inclined to do. A statute of limitations might 
be helpful in eliminating some of the down time in death penalty 
cases. As you know, the Attorneys General in the southern states 
are moving cases forward by using the threat of requesting a 
death warrant. This has the same operative effect as a statute of 
limitation. But it is an informal system and there may be 
disadvantages to continuing to proceed in that manner. 
Assuming a statute of limitation imposes some discipline on 
the death penalty litigation process by forcing all cases ahead 
at a certain pace, the problem remains that the system of post 
conviction review has so many discrete steps. Are they all 
necessary to attain fairness to death row inmates? Unless there 
is some interest in cutting out some redundancies in the system, 
I don't see how the average time for death penalty cases can be 
reduced substantially. 
Several of the capital 
with over the past few 
causes of delay in death 
litigation specialists 
weeks have offered their 
penalty cases. One is 
that I spoke 
views on the 
that courts 
occasionally don't act on the cases once the record is complete 
and the briefs have been submitted. This complaint seems to have 
been aimed at trial judges more than appellate judges. 
A second is that as the Supreme Court has dealt with many 
difficult death penalty issues lower courts have tended to hold 
cases in abeyance awaiting a definitive ruling on a point. When 
such a ruling comes down, if it is potentially beneficial to 
death row litigants, more delay results as the lower courts have 
to decide whether the new doctrine applies to pending cases. 
The point is that much of what we have seen to date is the 
result of rapidly and sometimes erratically developing legal 
doctrine in a ideologically charged area of the law. 
One individual was rather vehement in his intent to oppose 
any proposal that would make counsel available as a matter of 
right to death row inmates. It made no apparent difference that 
this right would . be tied to a statute of limitation mechanism. 
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DEATH PENALTY CASE HISTORIES 
TIME SHOWN IN DAYS 
INMATE & CRIME TO STATE FEDERAL SUPREME DOWN 
STATE EXECUTION COURT COURT COURT TIME 
1: . -Evans 2298 717 808 676 97 - (ALA) l/5/77*4/22/83 (31%) (35%) (30%) (4%) 
2. Jones 1678 1008 280 332 58 
(ALA) 8/17/81*3/21/86 (60%) (17%) (20%) (3%) 
3. Ritter 3881 1681 1315 806 79 
(ALA) l/5/77*8/28/87 (43%) ( 3 4%) (21%) (2%) 
4. Sullivan 3889 641 1425 734 1089 
(FL) 4/9/73*11/30/83 (16%) (37%) (19%) (28%) 
5. Antone 3026 1678 607 271 470 
(FL) 10/23/75*1/26/84 (55%) (20%) (9%) (16%) 
6. Goode 2957 1629 485 348 495 
(FL) 3/5/76*4/5/84 (55%) (16%) (12%) (17%) 
7. Adams 3831 1396 1323 601 511 
(FL) 11/12/73*5/10/84 (36%) (35%) (16%) (13%) 
8. Shriner 2799 1406 570 247 576 
(FL) 10/22/76*6/20/84 (50%) (20%) (19%) (21%) 
9. Washington 2954 757 597 805 695 
(FL) 9/20/76*7/13/84 (27%) (21%) (28%) (24%) 
10. Dobbert 4633 2495 662 878 598 
(FL) 12/31/71*9/7/84 (54%) (14%) (19%) (13%) 
11. Henry 3834 775 1096 781 1182 
(FL) 3/23/74*9/20/84 (20%) (29%) (20%) (31%) 
12. Palmes 2902 1659 654 301 288 
(FL) 11/4/76*11/8/84 (57%) (23%) (10%) (10%) 
13. Raulerson 3577 2083 733 538 212 
(FL) 4/27/75*1/20/85 (58%) (21%) (15%) (6%) 
14. Witt 4149 1542 1124 715 767 
(FL) 10/28/73*3/6/85 (37%) (27%) (17%) (18%) 
15. Francois 2975 1663 699 155 348 
(FL) 7/27/77*5/29/85 (57%) (24%) (5%) (12%) 
16. Thomas 3757 1379 1052 368 958 
(FL) 1/1/76*4/15/86 (37%) (28%) (10%) (25%) 
• • 
INMATE & CRIME TO STATE FEDERAL SUPREME OOWN 
STATE EXECUTION COURT COURT COURT TIME 
17. Funchess 4147 2389 1199 235 324 
(FL) 12/16/74*4/22/86 (58%) (29%) (6%) (8%) 
18. Straight 3524 1717 1234 310 263 
. -{FL) 10/4/76*5/20/86 (49%) (35%) (9%) (7%) 
19. White 3690 1619 543 683 845 
(FL) 7/27/77*8/28/87 (44%) (15%) (19%) (23%) 
20. Darden 5302 1018 2217 1308 759 
(FL) 9/8/73*3/15/88 (19%) (42%) (25%) (14%) 
21. Daugherty 4635 3062 192 628 753 
(FL) 3/l/76*11/7/88 (66%) (4%) (14%) (16%) 
22. Gray 2625 1236 778 553 58 
(MS) 6/25/76*8/26/83 (47%) (30%) (21%) (2%) 
23. Johnson 2910 1202 1385 88 235 
(MS) 6/2/79*5/20/87 (41%) (48%) ( 3%) (8%) 
24. Evans 2284 828 100 410 45 
(MS) 4/4/81*7/8/87 (36%) (44%) (18%) (2%) 
For your information: 
1 year= 365 days 6 years= 2190 days 
2 years= 730 days 7 years= 2555 days 
3 years= 1095 days 8 years= 2920 days 
4 years= 1460 days 9 years= 3285 days 
5 years= 1825 days 10 years= 3650 days 
